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Educating for Exclusion in Western China: structural and 
institutional dimensions of conflict in the Tibetan areas of 
Qinghai and Tibet  
 
 
Abstract 
This paper examines the conflictive repercussions of exclusionary processes in the 
Tibetan areas of western China, with a focus on Qinghai Province and the Tibet 
Autonomous Region. In both provinces, the implementation of competitive labour 
market reforms within a context of severe educational inequalities is argued to have 
accentuated exclusionary dynamics along linguistic, cultural and political modes of 
bias despite rapid urban-centred economic growth and increasing school enrolments 
since the mid-1990s. These modes of bias operate not only at lower strata of the 
labour hierarchy but also at upper strata. The resultant ethnically exclusionary 
dynamics, particularly in upper strata, offer important insights into conflictive tensions 
in the region.  
 
At a more theoretical level, these insights suggest that exclusion needs to be 
differentiated from poverty (even relative poverty) given that exclusionary processes 
can occur vertically throughout social hierarchies and can even intensify with 
movements out of poverty. Indeed, the most politically contentious exclusions are 
often those that occur among relatively elite and/or upwardly aspiring sections of a 
population. Therefore, the methodological challenge that faces studies of exclusion 
(as with the horizontal inequality approach) is to find ways of measuring structural 
asymmetries and disjunctures and institutional modes of integration that move 
beyond either absolute measures, as per mainstream human development 
approaches, or relative measures, given that both are only capable of identifying 
potential exclusions occurring at the bottom of a social hierarchy.  
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Educating for Exclusion in Western China: structural and institutional 
dimensions of conflict in the Tibetan areas of Qinghai and Tibet 
 
By Andrew M. Fischer 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In March 2008, a wave of large-scale demonstrations quickly spread from Lhasa to 
the Tibetan areas1 of Qinghai, Sichuan and Gansu over the course of about three 
weeks.2 Despite evident premonitions of tensions and discontent that had been 
brewing for years, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) argued that the ‘riots’ (in 
reference to the riot in Lhasa on 14 March) were due to political meddling and 
manipulation from abroad, particularly from the Tibetan exile community and their 
Western supporters. Given that the region had been experiencing ample 
development and rising prosperity, local Tibetans had no valid cause for grievance. 
This line was supported by some Western scholars and commentators who, at the 
extreme, tended to interpret the events as the covert handiwork of US 
neoconservatives.3  
 
Indeed, absolute economic and human development indicators offer little insight into 
the reasons why Tibetans might have been so aggrieved. Poverty rates had been 
falling, average household incomes rising, and levels of educational attainment 
moderately improving. Were it not for some restrictions on cultural or religious 
practices and the worrisome rise in inequalities and persistent political repression, 
many argued that the government had been attending well to the disadvantaged 
position of Tibetans in China. Many Chinese commentators went so far as to 
conclude that Tibetans, catered to by Central Government subsidies to a far greater 
extent than any other minority nationality in China, were quite simply spoilt – 
‘complaining with their stomachs full’.4 
 
                                               
1
 In this article, ‘China’ refers to the Peoples’ Republic of China (PRC) and ‘Tibet’ refers to all 
of the Tibetan areas in China, including the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) and the Tibetan 
areas that are incorporated into the provinces of Qinghai, Gansu, Sichuan and Yunnan. Often 
known as ‘Greater Tibet’ or ‘cultural Tibet,’ this region is about the size of Western Europe or 
about one-quarter of China. This larger understanding of Tibet is actually not controversial 
given that it conforms to administrative definitions in China, which identify Tibetan 
autonomous areas at various levels of jurisdiction. The TAR is equivalent to a province, 
whereas Tibetan areas incorporated into the other provinces are designated as either 
autonomous prefectures (TAPs) or counties (TACs). With the exception of some 
disagreements in the borderlands of Eastern Tibet, the Chinese administrative definitions are 
almost identical to the definition of Tibet used by the Tibetan Exile Government and they 
conform to the areas that Tibetans consider to be Tibet. Most of these highland areas, at 
average altitudes of well over 3,000 metres, are also clearly differentiated from non-Tibetan 
lowlands by topography and population density. While the TAR is the administrative area that 
the PRC government and most of the Western media usually mean when they refer to ‘Tibet,’ 
it only accounts for just over half of the Tibetan autonomous areas in China and less than half 
of the total Tibetan population in China. The boundaries of this region were determined by the 
territory controlled by Lhasa at the time of the PRC invasion in 1950.  
2
 For background on the protests and their aftermath, see Fischer (2008c) and Shakya 
(2008).   
3
 For the most prominent Western scholar in this regard, see Sautman (2008). For extreme 
versions, see Engdahl (2008) and Zizek (2000). See Yeh (2009) for an excellent critique. 
4
 Again, see Sautman (2008) for allusions to these arguments.   
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This paper explores why this was probably not the case. In so doing, it offers insight 
into the conflictive repercussions of what I call ‘exclusionary growth’ (Fischer 2005a). 
Notably, Beijing’s conviction that minority nationalism can be solved through the force 
of economic growth and improved livelihoods implies that grievances derive from 
developmental ‘backwardness’ and poverty. However, conflict appears to have 
intensified alongside development in Tibet and other parts of West China such as 
Xinjiang (East Turkestan), suggesting that the concept of poverty is ill-suited to 
explaining these conflicts. The concept of exclusion might be better suited, albeit only 
insofar as it is differentiated from poverty.  
 
Critical in this regard is the interaction between education and urban employment 
systems, here examined through the cases of Qinghai Province and the Tibet 
Autonomous Region (TAR), which together account for about three-quarters of the 
Tibetan areas and Tibetan population in China. Despite the pertinent differences 
between these two provinces as political and economic entities, considerable 
similarities exist across the Tibetan societies in both provinces, which help to explain 
the strong sense of nationalist resentment that is widespread across this region the 
size of Western Europe. Even though Tibetans in both provinces had experienced 
periods of indirect rule by various empires emanating from China through the 
centuries, their forcible integration into the People’s Republic of China in the 1950s 
represented their first ever experience of direct Chinese rule. This was followed by 
the dramatic upheaval of the Cultural Revolution and the complete collectivisation 
and then de-collectivisation of their rural areas in the space of less than 15 years. 
Both provinces became the most subsidised in China under the Maoist interior 
industrialisation and militarisation strategies of the 1960s and 1970s. Both endured 
attempts at population transfer during the same period, although these were largely 
unsuccessful.5 When regional systems of redistribution unravelled with the advent of 
reform in the early 1980s, both provinces quickly became the worst economic 
performers in China up to the mid-1990s. By the late 1990s, Tibetans in both 
provinces remained among the most rural in China and with the worst educational 
levels of all the major nationalities (i.e. ethnic groups) of the country.  
 
In response to economic lagging in its western hinterlands, the central government 
started several major policy initiatives in the early to mid-1990s to correct rising 
regional inequalities, from poverty alleviation campaigns to western development 
strategies. These were implemented alongside ongoing efforts to raise school 
enrolments, in line with the national goal set in 1986 of achieving nine-year 
compulsory education for all by 2000. These initiatives were accelerated in 1999 
when the government launched its ‘Open the West’ campaign (OWC; xibu da kaifa), 
in conjunction with its Tenth Five-Year Plan starting in 2000. The combined efforts 
brought a return to westward subsidisation, in which Qinghai remains the second 
most subsidised and the TAR the most. These efforts did indeed resuscitate growth; 
both Qinghai and the TAR have seen very rapid, above-national-average growth 
since the mid-1990s. However, the side effects included rapidly rising inequalities, 
particularly in the TAR, where most measures of inequality rose far beyond those 
observed elsewhere in China. 
 
Within this context, the implementation of competitive labour market reforms and 
educational campaigns, in a situation of underlying educational inequalities and 
political and economic subordination, became crucial mechanisms by which rapid 
growth resulted in an accentuation of ethnically exclusionary dynamics in these 
areas. In particular, the mechanisms accentuated linguistic, cultural and political 
                                               
5
 See Fischer (2008d) for background on these population issues and as background for this 
paper.  
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modes of bias deriving from characteristics of the dominant cultural and political 
group, such as Chinese fluency, Chinese work cultures, and connections to 
government or business networks in China proper. While labour market reforms have 
also generated problems elsewhere in China, such as high rates of unemployment 
among university graduates,6 the Tibetan areas manifest an exceptional structural 
asymmetry whereby the most educated category of local residents (urban Tibetan 
men) is much less educated on average than even the least educated category of 
inter-provincial migrants competing in local urban labour markets (i.e. rural women 
from Sichuan). Moreover, even university-educated Tibetans face disadvantages in 
this context, which are simply not reflected in the relative quantitative comparisons. In 
other words, on top of facing an institutional environment where opportunities created 
in the local economy are dominated by state-centred and externally oriented 
networks of power and wealth, Tibetan urban middle classes and elites also have to 
contend with the fact that they do not profit from natural educational advantages over 
the average Han migrant coming from elsewhere in China, contrary to all other 
regions of China. The resultant disadvantages, particularly in upper labour strata, 
offers important insights into recent tensions, even before considering the more 
blatant proximate causes such as prejudice, discrimination or political repression.  
 
These observations are important because they imply that two critical dimensions of 
current Tibet policy need to be seriously addressed in order to lessen both extreme 
economic polarisation and social instability. On the one hand, urban employment for 
locals requires protection and promotion at both the lower and upper strata. On the 
other hand, the linguistic and cultural disadvantages faced by Tibetans in urban 
employment need to be lessened, albeit in ways that do not undermine Tibetan 
language and culture. It is suggested that the existing national minority laws in China 
already provide ways to resolve both issues if their full implications were put into 
practice, as exemplified by the recommendation by the Tenth Panchen Lama that 
public sector employees working in Tibetan areas should have at least some working 
knowledge of the Tibetan language, supported by a strong promotion of bilingual 
education in the minority areas. 
 
At a more theoretical level, the insights from this study suggest that absolute 
indicators such as education levels or poverty rates, or even relative indicators such 
as educational or income inequalities, only offer partial insights into processes of 
exclusion or discrimination. Rather, attention must be placed on structural 
disjunctures and asymmetries and institutional modes of integration occurring across 
social hierarchies, not just at the bottom. Particular attention needs to be focused on 
qualitative educational inequalities and/or biases occurring among comparable 
educational cohorts sharing similar types of employment expectation. Such an 
approach brings to light the importance of differentiating exclusion from poverty (even 
relative poverty) given that exclusionary processes can occur vertically throughout 
social hierarchies, among the poor and the non-poor, and in many cases they might 
intensify with movements out of poverty, such as during urbanisation or rising 
education levels. Indeed, the most politically contentious exclusions are often those 
that occur among relatively elite or upwardly mobile sections of a population. 
Therefore, the methodological challenge that faces studies of exclusion, as with the 
horizontal inequality approach (i.e. Stewart 2002), lies in finding ways to measure 
structural disjunctures and asymmetries and institutional modes of integration that 
move beyond either absolute measures, as per mainstream approaches to human 
                                               
6
 For analyses of these issues in China, see Li (2002), Guo and Chang (2006), Li (2008) and 
Liu (2008). For an excellent survey, see Roulleau-Berger (2009).  
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development, or relative (i.e. inequality) measures, given that both are only capable 
of identifying potential exclusions occurring at the bottom of a social hierarchy.7 
 
The paper is based on quantitative analysis of official statistical data and over a year 
of accumulated fieldwork in West China between 2003 to 2007 (see the 
Methodological Appendix for details of the methods and data used). The first section 
presents a brief analysis of the structural patterns of rapid urban-centred economic 
growth since the mid-1990s. The second section examines the stagnant levels of 
educational outcomes and the exceptional educational asymmetries of the Tibetan 
areas. The third section offers an institutionalist analysis of the resultant ethnically 
exclusionary dynamics at both the lower and upper strata of the labour hierarchy, and 
how these dynamics are in turn reinforced by political and social subordination. It 
also delves into some of the Tibetan nationalist responses. The conclusion returns to 
some of the broader theoretical insights that this study brings to light. 
 
 
1. Rapid growth and polarisation 
 
A variety of structural disjunctures emerged within the context of development in the 
TAR and Qinghai from the mid-1990s onwards. Four dimensions of rapid economic 
and social change can be highlighted as a means to clarify these disjunctures. These 
include: the initiation of rapid subsidy-induced growth; rising urban-rural inequality; 
rapid shifts of the Tibetan labour force out of agriculture and into urban areas; and 
rapidly emerging intra-urban inequalities.  
 
In the first case, as noted in the introduction, after a period of stagnation and even 
recession in both the TAR and Qinghai up to 1995, the central government managed 
to initiate very rapid growth in the TAR from 1996 onwards and in Qinghai from 1998 
onwards (see Figure 1 below). This was achieved through the injection of massive 
volumes of direct budgetary subsidies and subsidised investments. In the case of the 
TAR, combined direct and indirect subsidies exceeded 100 per cent of GDP from 
2001 onwards.8 As a result, real per capita growth rates in the TAR surpassed the 
national average from 1996 to 1999 and again from 2001 to 2003, and they were the 
highest in western China for most of these years, exceeding 10 per cent a year. In 
Qinghai, they exceeded 10 per cent from 2003 onwards. Hence, the once-laggard 
performance of these two provinces was corrected and they started catching up with 
national average per capita GDP. To give an idea of the speed of such growth, the 
aggregate real GDP of the TAR grew by about three times between 1996 and 2004 
and by about two and a half times in Qinghai, whereas it only doubled in China as a 
whole, which was nonetheless one of the most unprecedented growth rates 
witnessed in modern history.  
 
In this sense, the western development strategies were quite successful in reversing 
the trend of worsening regional inequalities in the first two decades of the reform 
period. However, these strategies were very polarising within western regions and a 
sharp rise in intra-provincial inequalities accompanied the aggregate catch-up. This 
was particularly the case in the Tibetan areas, where heavy dependence on 
subsidies led to an excessively urban-centric strategy. Inequalities in the Tibetan 
areas were thereby structured according to the manner by which subsidies were 
channelled into the local economy, in contrast to other western areas, where 
inequalities were more rooted in patterns of local capital accumulation.  
 
                                               
7
 For further discussion on these theoretical implications, see Fischer (2008a). 
8
 See Fischer (2007; 2009) for further detail.  
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Figure 1: Real per capita GDP (2004 rmb), selected provinces, 1991-2004 
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Sources: calculated from CSY (2005: Tables 3-1, 3-11 and 9-5) and equivalent in CSY (1993-2004). 
 
The TAR offers the most extreme case; extreme and inefficient dependence on 
government sources of finance from outside the Tibetan areas (mostly from Beijing), 
together with the fact that such finance was predominately targeted at urban areas, 
led to an urban bias far stronger than that witnessed elsewhere in China. The fact 
that subsidies were channelled through the vehicle of the government itself or 
through state-owned enterprises from outside the Tibetan areas, with much of it 
focused on either administrative expansion or large-scale construction projects, led to 
a sharp distinction between those in positions of access to state-centred networks of 
wealth and those without. Local sources of accumulation offered little mitigation to 
these polarising dynamics, given their increasingly marginal role in driving change in 
the economy. While subsidisation was less generous in the Tibetan areas outside the 
TAR, de-industrialisation in these areas also resulted in intensified dependence on 
subsidies. In all of these cases, the dominance of Han Chinese in the state-centred 
networks of wealth and power meant that the opportunities generated by these 
strategies largely advantaged workers and entrepreneurs with Chinese fluency, 
Chinese work cultures, and connections to government or business networks in 
China, in addition to the obvious political biases accorded to central government 
spending in this contested region as well.9  
 
The resultant ethnically exclusionary dynamics are best reflected by sharply rising 
inequalities far above the national experience. Such inequality is evidenced in Figure 
2, below, with respect to urban-rural inequality, one of the dimensions of inequality 
most commonly referred to in China. Figure 2 measures the ratio of per capita urban 
disposable household income (of households registered as permanently residing) to 
per capita rural household income, both deflated by their respective urban and rural 
consumer price indices. Note that there is a significant discrepancy in the TAR urban 
household income data from 2002 onwards, in that ‘total income’ starts to exceed 
‘disposable income’ by a considerable margin. The source of this discrepancy is 
explored in Fischer (2007: 185-86); suffice to say that the upper range probably more 
accurately reflects the spans of wealth in the TAR. Both sets of data are used for the 
TAR from 2002 onwards in order to show the alternative trends, which is not 
                                               
9
 Again, see Fischer (2007; 2009) for detailed analyses of these economic dynamics.  
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necessary for the other provinces given that the slight discrepancy between 
disposable and total incomes is insignificant.  
 
Figure 2: Urban-rural inequality, selected provinces, constant 2004 rmb 
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Sources: calculated from CSY (2005, Tables 9-5, 10-15 and 10-21) and equivalent tables in previous 
yearbooks. 
 
To put these data into perspective, urban-rural inequality is generally higher in 
western China than in eastern China due to the fact that urban state-sector wages 
are equalised to a national standard while rural incomes are not. The poverty of the 
western rural areas results in a greater divide between the western urban and rural 
areas than is the case nationally, particularly in comparison to coastal China, where 
many rural areas have profited from rural industrialisation. As a result, it is generally 
the case that the poorer the rural area, the greater the urban-rural divide. One would 
therefore expect that urban-rural inequality would be highest in the Tibetan areas, 
given that rural incomes have been among the lowest in China according to official 
data. 
 
Indeed, as observed in the figure above, by the mid-1990s, the highest ratio is 
observed in the TAR, followed by Yunnan. However, the ratio in the TAR increased 
sharply in the mid-1990s, precisely at the same time that it was falling nationally and 
in every other western province due to a combination of pro-rural poverty reduction 
strategies and good agricultural performance from 1994 to 1997. In all of the other 
western provinces, the fluctuations in urban-rural inequality more or less followed the 
national pattern, multiplied by a factor to account for heightened disparity. In contrast, 
the sharp increase in the TAR reflects the fact that real rural incomes, according to 
official data, were stagnant throughout the 1990s, and only recovered to their real 
1992 value by 2003. On the other hand, urban incomes in the TAR were above the 
national average, largely due to a surge in the average money wages of staff and 
workers (mostly state-sector), which reached the highest in China in 2002.10  
 
These data reflect the fact that the take-off of the TAR in the mid-1990s was primarily 
urban and excessively de-linked from the local rural economy, at least up until the 
early 2000s. Urban-rural inequality reached a dizzying height of 5.8 in 2002 
(according to the total income data), i.e. the average urban per capita income was 
5.8 times higher than the average rural per capita income – a level never before seen 
                                               
10
 See Fischer (2005a; 2007) for detailed analyses of these wage data.  
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in the PRC, where urban-rural inequality is nonetheless a serious concern. This 
measure of disparity started to fall in the TAR after 2002, converging with the next 
most unequal western provinces except at much higher levels of inequality than in 
the early 1990s given that urban-rural inequality started to rise again throughout 
China from 1998 onwards. The fall in the TAR in part reflects strong growth in per 
capita rural incomes after 2002, most likely due to a variety of initiatives to increase 
rural incomes from 2003 onwards.11  
 
If these data do in fact represent real changes, the reversal in urban-rural inequality 
in the TAR from 2001 onwards might also be explained by the fact that the Tibetan 
labour force experienced one of the fastest, albeit latest, shifts out of agriculture from 
the late 1990s onwards. In Tibetan areas, a shift out of agriculture implies 
urbanisation, given the relative shortage of rural off-farm economic opportunities, in 
contrast to more central and coastal areas of China where much off-farm labour 
remains in rural areas. For instance, township and village enterprises, private 
enterprises or self-employment outside of household production accounted for only 
4.8 per cent of rural employment in the TAR in 2004, versus 21.6 per cent in Qinghai, 
23.5 per cent in Sichuan, and 36.9 per cent for China as a whole (calculated from 
CSY 2005: Table 5-4). Thus, while the Sichuan labour force was less urbanised than 
that of the TAR, it was also much less agrarian. The sheer scarcity of off-farm rural 
employment in the TAR (and other Tibetan areas) implies that most movements out 
of agriculture by and large imply movements to towns and cities, and urban labour 
markets are relatively much more central to labour transitions in the Tibetan areas 
than in other parts of western China. Therefore, while the measurement of 
urbanisation is very problematic in China,12 it can be inferred for the Tibetan areas 
through employment data. These are shown in Figure 3 (p. 10 below), with reference 
to shares of the labour force in the primary sector (mostly farming and herding).  
 
The shift of labour out of the primary sector was more gradual in China broadly and 
in Sichuan, albeit still rapid from a comparative international perspective; the share in 
Sichuan dropping from 67 per cent in 1993 to 53 per cent in 2004. In contrast, the 
shift started later and faster in Qinghai and the TAR. In Qinghai the primary share 
suddenly fell after 2001, dropping almost 9 per cent between 2001 and 2004. At the 
beginning of this period, the TAR had the most agrarian workforce in China, with 78 
per cent of the labour employed in the primary sector in 1994. As with Qinghai, this 
primary share was stable until 1999 and then fell sharply, by more than 12 per cent 
up to 2004, although it still remained one of the most agrarian provinces in China, 
with almost 64 per cent of the surveyed labour force working in agriculture. 
 
                                               
11
 See Goldstein et al (2008). These initiatives were also indicated to me in an interview with a 
Tibetan government official dealing with rural development policy, conducted in Lhasa in 
November 2004.  
12
 Temporal comparisons of urbanisation rates below the national level in China are rendered 
very difficult given that urban definitions are quite different in each of the five censuses (see 
Yixing and Ma 2003). On the other hand, annual surveys on population change are only 
based on people registered as permanently residing. They therefore provide no basis for 
evaluating changes due to migration.  
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Figure 3: Share of labour force in primary sector, selected provinces, 1993-2004 
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Sources: CSY (2005: Table 5-3) and equivalent tables in yearbooks from 1994 to 2004. 
 
The declining share in the TAR also represents an absolute decline, suggesting that 
the Tibetan rural areas are starting to enter a phase of depopulation. The absolute 
number working in the primary sector in the TAR reached its peak in 1999 at 922,000 
people, and then fell to 860,000 in 2004, despite relatively rapid rates of natural 
population increase in these rural areas. While it is difficult to know the degree to 
which migrant labour is included in these aggregate labour statistics, primary sector 
employment in the TAR is almost entirely composed of Tibetans given that the rural 
areas were 98 per cent Tibetan in the 2000 population census, and these rural 
Tibetans in turn accounted for about 85 per cent of the total Tibetan population in the 
province.13 Thus, the drop in absolute numbers in primary employment demonstrates 
that this remarkably rapid transition in the local labour structure was happening 
regardless of the influence that non-Tibetan out-of-province migrants might have had 
on relative employment shares in the urban areas.14 This is strongly in line with the 
field observations by Goldstein et al (2008), who argue that a rapid ‘paradigm shift’ 
had taken place between 1997 and 2005 in the three villages they surveyed in 
Central Tibet, from a predominantly subsistence agricultural economy to a new mixed 
economy in which non-farm income plays a dominant role. The aggregate trends in 
Qinghai, supported by my own qualitative field observations, suggest similar 
transitions among the indigenous Tibetan Buddhists and Muslims of this province, 
who accounted for about 56 per cent of the rural population of Qinghai in the 2000 
census.     
 
                                               
13
 See Fischer (2008d) for a detailed analysis of these population data.  
14
 Of course, a counter-argument might be made that these trends could partly reflect 
arbitrary changes in the administrative status, such as government attempts to encourage 
urbanisation by giving urban non-agricultural status to people living near small county seats 
but who are effectively still working in agriculture. However, to the best of my knowledge, the 
labour surveys represent different definitions of the population to those used in the population 
surveys, based as they are on employment status rather than population registration status.  
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Rapid urbanisation would tend to balance out urban-rural inequality if only by 
reducing the absolute number of people in the rural areas. This would increase per 
capita incomes by simple arithmetic, provided that the transfer of labour out of 
agriculture and the rural areas more generally does not lead to a decrease in 
aggregate rural household output or income (a condition behind the concept of 
surplus labour). However, the subsequent impact of declining urban-rural inequality 
on overall inequality depends on the trends in both intra-rural inequality (inequality 
between rural households) and intra-urban inequality (inequality between urban 
households). In terms of the former, Goldstein et al observed sharp increases in both 
the farming and the pastoral areas they studied in western Tibet between the late 
1990s and 2005.15 Intra-urban inequality is more difficult to measure, in part due to 
the fact that household income surveys only include households registered as 
permanently residing, thereby excluding most migrants. Moreover, tabulated income 
distribution data from urban household surveys are not regularly provided for the 
TAR and other western provinces, making trend analysis difficult.  
 
A round-about method can be used to circumvent these data limitations for 
measuring intra-urban inequality, which I innovated in Fischer (2007). Two sources of 
data are available in most years; average money wages of staff and workers and per 
capita urban incomes. In the former case, ‘staff and workers’ are a relatively 
privileged sub-category of urban employment in China, referring to persons working 
(permanently or on contract) in units of state ownership, collective ownership, joint 
ownership, share holding ownership, and foreign ownership (including Hong Kong, 
Macao, and Taiwan).16 There is no publicly available data for wage rates other than 
for staff and workers, i.e. none is available for those in the lower strata of the urban 
labour hierarchy, such as construction workers not working under contract. However, 
the money wages of staff and workers would cover many of the privileged temporary 
migrants working in the state-sector of the TAR and other Tibetan areas, typically for 
terms of two to three years. In the latter case, urban household incomes are derived 
primarily (entirely in the TAR in 2004) from salaries and wages earned by all 
households registered as permanently residing (i.e. not including migrants) from all 
forms of employment, not only staff and workers. In others words, urban household 
incomes reflect an average of all forms of remuneration by all urban residents 
registered as permanently residing (about three-quarters Tibetan in the TAR).  
 
Therefore, the comparison of average wages of staff and workers to average per 
capita urban household incomes can give an indirect indication of wage inequality 
between the privileged upper strata of urban employees (including migrants and 
about half of the registered urban workforce in the TAR) and the average of all 
(permanently registered) urban employed. While it is to be expected that average 
money wages would be marginally higher than per capita urban household incomes 
even in a relatively egalitarian setting given that per capita household calculations 
include both working and dependent household members, rising inequality can be 
inferred by a rising ratio. Figure 4 below shows this proxy measure of urban wage 
inequality for a selection of western provinces from 1998 to 2004.  
 
                                               
15
 In the case of the farming communities in Shigatse Prefecture in the TAR, see Goldstein et 
al (2008). In the case of the pastoral communities, findings were presented by Melvyn 
Goldstein at two conferences in 2006 (Bonn, August 2006; and Harvard, December 2006), 
and through personal communications from November 2005 to August 2007.   
16
 Staff and workers do not include persons employed in township or private enterprises, 
urban self-employed persons, retirees, re-employed retirees, teachers in the schools run by 
local people, foreigners, persons from Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan, and other persons not 
included by ‘relevant regulations’ (CSY 2005: explanatory notes for Chapter 5). 
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Figure 4: Proxy measure of urban wage inequality, 1998-2004 (current values) 
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Sources: calculated from CSY (2005, Tables 5-21 and 10-15) and equivalent in previous yearbooks. 
 
Figure 4 reveals sharply increasing urban wage inequality in the TAR, more 
accentuated with respect to disposable incomes and less accentuated with respect to 
total incomes, but in both cases far above the next most unequal province of Qinghai. 
The ratio of staff and worker wages to urban disposable incomes in the TAR rose 
from below 2 in 1999 to 3.4 by 2004, versus 2.4 in Qinghai, 1.9 in Gansu, 1.8 in 
Sichuan and 1.7 in China as a whole. This confirms the suggestion that intra-urban 
inequality has taken over from urban-rural inequality as the main source of rising 
disparity in the TAR since 2000. 
 
Two main trends explain this sharp rise. A rising wage/income ratio could represent 
rising wages of staff and workers relative to the average of all urban wages. Or, it 
could represent a falling share of staff and worker employment in total urban 
employment (among households registered as permanently residing), thereby 
reducing the weight of staff and worker wages in average urban incomes. Both cases 
appear to apply to the TAR.  
 
First, the money wages of staff and workers in the TAR, which were always above 
the national average due to ‘hardship’ considerations,17 suddenly rose even further, 
from 1.5 times the national average money wages of staff and workers to two times 
in 2002. Notably, they became the highest in China in 2002 and again in 2004.18 This 
represents an upward revaluation of hardship compensations exclusive to the TAR, 
regardless of general considerations in the rest of the country. In contrast, per capita 
urban disposable household incomes in the TAR fell below the national average for 
the first time in 2004, in stark divergence from the jump in wages of staff and workers 
(previously, urban incomes in the TAR had been somewhat higher than the national 
                                               
17
 The TAR ranks at the highest of 11 levels in a ranking of so-called ‘hardship’ posts in public 
sector employment in China (‘hardship’ defined according to a lowland Han Chinese 
perspective). 
18
 Annual average money wages of state-sector staff and workers in 2004 was 30,873 yuan 
for the TAR, 29,674 yuan for Beijing, 16,024 yuan for the national average, and 13,623 yuan 
for Gansu, the second poorest province in China according to per capita GDP. In contrast, per 
capita urban household incomes in the same year were 9,106 yuan for the TAR, 9,422 yuan 
for the national average, and 7,377 yuan for Gansu. Per capita rural household incomes were 
1,861 yuan for the TAR, 2,936 yuan for the national average, and 1,852 yuan for Gansu. 
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average). This implies that the incomes of those without state-sector employment 
were increasingly lagging behind.  
 
Second, these sharp increases in nominal and relative staff and worker wages took 
place simultaneously with a reduction in the absolute number of Tibetan staff and 
workers in state-owned units between 2001 and 2003, while the number of non-
Tibetans rose. The fall in staff and worker employment in state-owned units was not 
compensated by a rise in staff and worker employment in non-state-owned units, as 
was the case elsewhere in China where reductions in the state-sector were matched 
by increased corporate-sector employment. To the contrary, the state-owned share 
of total staff and worker employment in the TAR actually rose from 92.2 per cent in 
2000 to 94.4 per cent in 2004. The reductions in Tibetan employment appear to be 
related to a streamlining of public employment, given that the total number of all 
state-sector staff and workers also fell, although by less than the fall in the number of 
Tibetans employed, whereas the number of non-Tibetans employed increased (see 
Figure 5 below). As a result, the share of Tibetans in total staff and worker 
employment in state-owned units fell from 71.3 to 64.6 per cent, while that of non-
Tibetans rose from 28.7 to 35.4 per cent.  
 
Underlying this shake-up, there was an even sharper fall in the Tibetan share of the 
more privileged category of cadre employment, which accounted for two-thirds of 
permanent state-sector employment in 2003. Overall cadre employment increased 
from 69,927 cadres in 2000 to 88,734 in 2003, while the number of Tibetan cadres 
fell from 50,039 to 44,069, or from 72 per cent of total cadre employment to just less 
than 50 per cent. While Tibetans have reportedly always been underrepresented at 
the higher levels of the cadre hierarchy, this shift, particularly in 2003, reveals a 
sudden move away from Tibetan representation in the government more generally, 
with non-Tibetan cadres outnumbering Tibetan cadres for the first time since 1980. 
Thus, government assertions that Tibetans were the dominant beneficiaries of the 
increasing state-sector wages, thereby contributing to an emerging ‘middle class’ of 
Tibetans,19 became much more tenuous by 2003, after which the government 
stopped publishing this particular disaggregation of employment data for the TAR.20 
 
Figure 5: Total numbers of staff and workers in the TAR, 1999-2003 
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19
 See PRC (2001). For an academic version, see Sautman and Eng (2001). 
20
 Coincidentally, I published a report on these data in early 2005 (see TIN 2005) on the basis 
of data provided in TSY (2004). The subsequent TSY (2005) no longer reported this data.  
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In sum, employment in the TAR, especially Tibetan employment, was shrinking in 
precisely the parts of the economy that were growing fastest, i.e. the urban state 
sector. Conversely, many of the non-Tibetans in this category were probably 
temporary residents on short terms of official duty in the TAR. Therefore, many were 
probably not included in any of the household income data, although they would have 
been reflected in the employment and wage data. While their inclusion into the 
household income data might temper the appearance of rising urban inequality, this 
does not take away from the fact that these data clearly reflect that local, 
permanently registered urban Tibetans bore most of the brunt of rising inequality, 
primarily by being squeezed out of state-sector employment, which accounts for 
almost all privileged forms of employment in the province. As a result, the sharp 
wage increases were decidedly and disproportionately captured by non-Tibetans and 
by a shrinking share of permanently registered urban households.   
 
Outside the state sector, the whole array of so-called ‘spontaneous’ migrants (i.e. 
migration not organised by the state, as it is referred to in the China literature) are 
simply not included in any of these data sources. We have little means to fill this 
lacuna in the Tibetan urban areas except through informed speculation. These 
migrants include Han Chinese, Chinese Muslim, or even Tibetans from other parts of 
Tibet, who largely come on their own initiative to ply their trades independently in the 
urban areas, such as businessmen, construction workers, shoe menders, restaurant 
owners, cooks, tailors, rickshaw or taxi drivers, sex workers, or even beggars.21 Such 
migrants are not necessarily competing for state-sector employment, except in the 
cases of state-owned construction companies hiring out-of-province migrants (albeit 
in these cases hiring is often arranged outside the province altogether). Except in 
such state-sector construction work where wages (and entire project funding) are 
subsidised, direct monetary incentives are not necessarily being offered by the state 
to these migrants.22 Nonetheless, high state-sector wages do offer some indication of 
the indirect incentives derived from the subsidy-induced affluence in the urban areas 
of the TAR relative to the average conditions found in most other areas of western or 
central (or, in some cases, even coastal) China. While it is difficult to deduce the 
impact of these migrants on inequality, perhaps more importantly, it is precisely the 
confluence of these different streams of migrants in the Tibetan urban areas, 
together with local urbanising rural Tibetans and permanent urban Tibetans, that 
creates the playing field for competition over urban employment opportunities. The 
best way to assess how level this playing field is is through an examination of 
education levels.  
 
 
2. Educational Inequality 
 
The education and skills imbalance between locals and inter-provincial migrants in 
the Tibetan areas is best portrayed by inter-provincial comparisons of education 
levels, expressed as illiteracy rates or as the proportion of the population with 
education up to certain levels. Illiteracy or no schooling usually implies few skills 
beyond subsistence agriculture, basic trades or localised commerce. Literacy in any 
official language qualifies one as literate in the Chinese surveys. Therefore, this 
measure does not necessarily offer a good evaluation of Chinese literacy, given that 
                                               
21
 For instance, see Ma and Lhundrup (2006) on temporary migrant occupational patterns in 
Lhasa. 
22
 The idea that ‘spontaneous’ migrants are directly subsidised by the state is a common 
Tibetan belief (exile and local). However, during fieldwork in the TAR in 2004, I could find no 
indications of this except in state-sector construction projects such as the railway, where 
wages on offer are higher than normal wages. 
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the government itself estimates that about 80 per cent of the rural population of the 
TAR does not speak or understand Chinese, whether literate or illiterate.23 A primary 
level of education can be considered at best low or semi-skilled (outside agriculture). 
Moreover, the medium of most rural primary education in the TAR (and other Tibetan 
areas) is the Tibetan language and thus a primary level of education in these areas 
probably precludes literacy in Chinese or even functional proficiency in spoken 
Chinese. Significant skills formation starts to take place at the secondary and 
vocational levels, as well as Chinese fluency in the Tibetan areas, where most 
secondary education switches over to the Chinese language medium. Completed 
senior high school or tertiary education would be a necessary qualification for state-
sector staff and worker employment.  
 
Four provinces suffice for this comparison. Sichuan is the most important source of 
emigration to the TAR and to the Tibetan areas of Sichuan and Qinghai, while Gansu 
is the second most important source.24 Education indicators in these two provinces 
and the national average therefore give a broad indication of the average skill levels 
in the sources of emigration to the Tibetan areas. As pointed out in much migration 
research, migrants often have higher levels of education than the average in their 
sources of emigration. In other words, those who migrate are not necessarily the 
most destitute or deprived in their communities, but rather tend to be among the 
more educated, entrepreneurial and even wealthy (given that it generally requires 
resources to finance migration). This insight is confirmed by several surveys in Lhasa 
among both Tibetan and Han temporary migrants.25 Nonetheless, levels of education 
in the sources of emigration reflect the general culture of education and skills that the 
migrants have been influenced by, are leaving from, and maintain networks with, 
throughout the course of their migration. 
 
The illiteracy rates among the population aged 15 and older from 1990 to 2004 are 
shown in Figure 6 below. In all provinces shown, illiteracy rates appear to have 
declined over time, although variability between censuses and surveys makes exact 
evaluation difficult. Very high illiteracy rates (over 60 per cent) were recorded in the 
TAR throughout the 1990s, but then the 2000 census recorded a significantly lower 
rate (47 per cent). This was probably due to more accurate measurement given that 
the 2000 census is considered as the most accurate measure of the population. 
From this adjusted level, illiteracy rates in the TAR recorded no significant change up 
to 2006. The pattern in the other provinces appears similar, albeit at much lower 
levels of illiteracy. Such stagnancy in literacy improvements throughout the country is 
perturbing, particularly considering that the economy more than tripled over the same 
period. It definitely points to some important structural impediments within the 
Chinese growth model.  
                                               
23
 This government statistic came from a presentation by Robert Barnett on the television 
content of Xizang TV, which mostly broadcasts in Tibetan, during a conference in Vancouver 
in April 2004. 
24
 According to the 2000 population census, 63 per cent of the population in the TAR with 
their place of household registration based outside the TAR were from Sichuan, or 68,496 
people out of a total of 108,669 (Tibet Census Tabulation, Table 7-2). Lower shares for 
Sichuan were measured by Ma and Lhundup (2006: 16-17) in their survey of 1,470 migrants 
in Lhasa in September-October 2005, in which 30 per cent were from Sichuan and 24 per 
cent from Gansu, including both Tibetan and Han. However, it is not clear to what degree 
their survey was representative of the broader migrant population.  
25
 For instance, the education levels of both Han and Tibetan temporary migrants in Lhasa in 
Iredale et al (2001: 156), based on two surveys in the mid-1990s, and Ma and Lhundrup 
(2006: 16), based on a survey in 2005, are significantly higher than the corresponding 
national average or the local Tibetan levels. The authors do not make this observation; I have 
drawn the insight from comparison to official statistical sources, as analysed below. 
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Figure 6: Illiteracy rates in selected western provinces and the national average and 
two-period moving averages, 1990-2007 
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Source: CSY (1999: Tables 4-8 and 4-9) and equivalent tables in earlier and later yearbooks. 
 
Indeed, at first sight the stagnation in literacy improvement is surprising given the 
degree to which official government discourse emphasises education and human 
resources within its western development strategies. Moreover, my own field 
observations, as well as those of Bangsbo (2008) also in Qinghai, and Goldstein et al 
(2008) in the TAR, clearly seem to indicate that there has been a strong push 
towards schooling from within Tibetan communities since the late 1990s, although 
this might vary from place to place. My own observations in Qinghai apply most 
strongly to Rongwo Town in Rebgong County (Ch. Tongren) and Chabcha Town in 
Chabcha County, both located in farming regions close to Xining City and serving as 
cultural and educational centres. However, based on discussions with several 
Tibetan teachers and scholars and one Western scholar during fieldwork in 2004, it 
seems that there was still considerable resistance towards schooling in the more 
remote pastoral areas of Golok and Yushu.26 Nonetheless, even in these contexts, 
overall enrolment rates appear to have increased since the mid-1990s.  
 
Several possible reasons might explain the stagnant literacy rates despite these field 
observations. One is simply the issue of a time lag; if educational drives started in the 
late 1990s or early 2000s and targeted enrolments among primary-school-aged 
children, these initiatives would still take five to 10 years before appearing in the 
population aged 15 and older. Age-specific education data would offer a much better 
                                               
26
 This was due to a combination of very poor conditions in the boarding schools of these 
remote prefectures, disappointment with the employment outcomes of many recent 
graduates, and the fact that families preferred to keep their children, particularly their sons, 
engaged in pastoral activities. Notably, students, teachers and parents unanimously agreed 
that, once sent to boarding schools in county towns for several years, particularly at the 
secondary level, students rarely return to farming or herding.  
CRISE Working Paper No. 69 
 
 
17 
evaluation of changes in this respect, but these are not available in the official data.27 
Indeed, the largest cohort in the 2000 population census was in the 10 to 14 age 
group. Much of this cohort might have missed out on earlier educational drives in the 
mid to late-1990s but nonetheless would have had a disproportionate impact on 
illiteracy rates in surveys for several years after 2000 as they reached the age of 15 
and above but before younger more educated cohorts would have started to reach 
the same age threshold. Perhaps this explains the sudden drop in the illiteracy rate 
for the TAR to 37 per cent in 2007, which was the lowest level ever recorded. 
However, given the large variations from year to year in the illiteracy rates measured 
by the population surveys, it is too early to tell whether this sharp drop in illiteracy in 
2007 represents a sustained trend. Notably, the One-Percent Population Survey of 
2005, which is considered to be the most accurate measure of the Chinese 
population since the 2000 census, recorded an illiteracy rate of 45 per cent in the 
TAR.   
 
One alternative explanation is also plausible and worth considering. It is possible that 
the poor quality of many rural schools has resulted in a situation of poor educational 
outcomes despite improving educational participation. This possibility is supported by 
numerous field observations.  For instance, I visited one village school in Yushu 
where three grades of primary-level students were taught more or less the same 
class from year to year by a teacher who was regularly absent and often inebriated 
when present. In the context of a survey, such students would be recorded as 
enrolled and having achieved some level of primary education, although they would 
probably fail the basic literacy test of the same survey. Similarly, Tashi Rabgey notes 
cases from her fieldwork in the Tibetan areas of Sichuan where students who 
completed five years of primary education were still unable to read or write their 
names.28 Hence, if the official data do contain some element of objectivity, it is 
probable according to this reasoning that improving levels of education are consistent 
with stagnant levels of educational outcome as measured by literacy. In other words, 
increasing levels of primary enrolment might not result in improved literacy outcomes 
if such enrolments are taking place in already poorly funded, low-quality and often 
overcrowded rural schools. Indeed, this is one of the important fallacies of 
educational strategies that push enrolments within poorly funded and dysfunctional 
school systems without regard for equally if not more intensive complementary efforts 
to improve and increase educational infrastructure.29  
 
This argument is further supported in the Tibetan areas by the notable undersupply 
of primary, secondary and vocational education infrastructure in the TAR relative to 
other western provinces or the national average (measured in terms of number of 
schools and teachers per person). Although the TAR has one of the youngest 
                                               
27
 In personal communications from December 2007, Melvyn Goldstein provided me with age-
specific education data from their surveys of three villages in Shigatse Prefecture, TAR. 
These data definitely showed strong increases in education levels between 1998 and 2006 
among cohorts aged 15 to 20 years old.  
28
 Presentation made in Oslo, December 2008, and personal communications.  
29
 Notably, rural schools in much of rural China are severely constrained in terms of funding 
due to the policy of requiring rural areas to be more or less fiscally self-sufficient (see Wong 
1997). In this context, the strategy of simply abolishing tuition fees can be crippling to such 
schools given that it removes one of their few sources of funding. The strategy can ironically 
reinforce poor educational outcomes even though motivated by the aim to assist poor families 
in sending their children to school. This is not an argument for tuition fees but, rather, that 
policy needs to focus on infrastructural supply-side issues as much as, if not more than, the 
current mainstream emphasis on demand-side interventions such as conditional cash 
transfers, vouchers and other such policy devices deriving from New Public Management 
practices, such as those promoted by World Bank (2003).  
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populations in China, it had less than the national average number of primary schools 
and primary school teachers per capita in 2001, almost half the number of regular 
and senior secondary schools and teachers per capita, and one-quarter the number 
of vocational schools per capita. This undersupply persists despite relatively high 
levels of per capita government revenue spent in education, which is largely 
explained by higher costs of providing education in the Tibetan areas, particularly in 
terms of much higher salaries than elsewhere in China (mostly with reference to 
urban schools), and the fact that the education system in the TAR is top-heavy, i.e., 
tertiary education is oversupplied relative to the rest of China, in contrast to the 
primary and secondary levels (Fischer 2005a: 65-69).   
 
Regardless of the reasons for these literacy outcomes in both Tibet and elsewhere in 
China, inter-provincial comparisons reveal several exceptional asymmetries faced by 
Tibetan areas, both at the lower end of attainment in terms of literacy and at the 
upper end in terms of secondary education and above. In the first case, Table 1 
below disaggregates the 2004 illiteracy rates by rural, town and city. The data is 
taken from the annual survey on population changes, which is based on the 
population registered as permanently residing, unlike the 2000 census which made 
some attempt to include temporary residents (i.e. migrants). As a result, the city and 
town survey data for the TAR represent a sample that is around three-quarters 
Tibetan.30 The category of ‘city’ in the TAR survey refers to the two main cities of 
Lhasa and Shigatse (TSY 2005: Table 3-7). The town category is not reported in 
these statistics for the TAR, although many of the small towns are effectively rural in 
any case, whereas they are more urban in the more densely populated areas of 
China. All the Tibetan urban centres in Qinghai, Gansu and Sichuan would be 
classified as ‘towns.’  
 
Table 1: Illiteracy rates among the population aged 15 and older, 2004 survey 
 Total Rural Town City Rural/City 
TAR 44.0% 42.6% --- 47.4% 0.9 
Qinghai 22.1 % 31.9 % 9.1 % 5.9 % 5.4 
Gansu 19.4 % 25.4 % 5.3 % 5.6 % 4.5 
Sichuan 11.5 % 14.4 % 6.9 % 3.6 % 4.0 
China 10.3 % 13.7 % 7.7 % 4.8 % 2.9 
Source: CPSY (2005: Tables 1-27, 1-28, 1-29, 1-30)  
 
The exceptionally high level of city illiteracy in the TAR is remarkable; in 2004 it was 
actually higher than the rural rate (47 versus 43 per cent), which was already very 
high for China. Obviously, the small city sample of the TAR (n=586) would tend to 
lead to more substantial measurement errors from year to year in comparison to the 
larger provinces, although these results are broadly consistent with earlier surveys. 
Some of these changes might also represent administrative expansions of Lhasa and 
Shigatse, whereby semi-rural peri-urban areas and their less educated populations 
are absorbed by the expanding boundaries of these cities. 
 
In contrast, city rates in the other provinces were only small fractions of their 
respective rural rates and quite close to the national average. Comparisons with 
older data also show that their lag with the national average was narrowing due to 
consistent improvements in city rates since 2001. Slower improvements were made 
in the rural rates of these other provinces, with the result that the ratio of rural/city 
illiteracy rates rose sharply in most cases, revealing the urban bias in current 
                                               
30
 More than half of the Chinese in the 2000 census were temporary residents and thus not 
surveyed in the non-census years. This can be extrapolated by comparing the census data to 
the data reported from Public Security Department (PSD) sources in the non-census years 
(see Fischer 2008d: 658-659). 
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education strategies across China. The TAR was the only exception, in the perverse 
sense that high rates of urban illiteracy were sustained despite the heavy urban bias 
in economic strategy.  
 
Out-of-province Han migrants in the TAR are best described by the rates of Sichuan, 
which were close to the national average and to other core western provinces such 
as Shaanxi. The most extreme comparison is between the city illiteracy rates of 
Sichuan and the rural illiteracy rates of the TAR, which is appropriate given that many 
of the Sichuanese migrants in the TAR emigrate from urban conditions, whereas 
local urbanisation in the TAR involves migration from Tibetan rural areas. In this 
case, the rural TAR rate of 42.6 per cent contrasts appallingly with the city Sichuan 
rate of 3.6 per cent. Iredale et al (2001: 156) measured a similar spread between 
Tibetan and Han migrants in Lhasa in the mid-1990s. Even in the least extreme 
comparison, rural Sichuanese are more than three times less likely to be illiterate 
than city residents in the TAR, at 14 and 47 per cent respectively. This strong 
educational advantage of (Han) rural migrants over (Tibetan) city residents is an 
anomaly that is simply not observed anywhere else in China.  
 
In Qinghai, there was a sharp difference between the rural rate, the second highest in 
the country and similar to the TAR rural rate up to the early 2000s, and the city and 
town rates, which were much closer to the national norm. This city-rural disparity 
within Qinghai is plausibly equivalent to the inter-provincial comparison between 
Sichuan and the TAR given that it essentially reflects the contrast between the 
urbanised Han northeast core of the province and the Tibetan areas. Similarly, many 
of the Han (and Muslim and Tibetan) migrants in the Qinghai Tibetan areas emigrate 
from the northeast core of the province, while Qinghai Tibetans were 91 per cent 
rural in the 2000 census and likely had education levels very close to those of the 
TAR on average. Illiteracy for all Tibetans in China (about double the population of 
Tibetans in the TAR) was identical to the TAR in the 2000 census (see CPSY 2003: 
Table 2-2), implying that illiteracy rates among Tibetans inside and outside the TAR 
were almost identical on average.  
 
The severe educational asymmetry between local Tibetans and non-Tibetan migrants 
is even more evident in Table 2 below, which decomposes the data by sex. A Tibetan 
woman migrating from the rural areas of the TAR was about 35 times more likely to 
be illiterate than a male city resident migrating from Sichuan. Inversely, a woman in 
rural Sichuan was almost 1.7 times more likely to be literate than a permanent-
resident man in Lhasa in 2004, despite the fact that she was less than half as likely to 
be literate than her male counterpart in rural Sichuan. Again, the exceptional 
anomaly of the Tibetan areas is to be noted; the most educated local cohort (male 
city permanent residents) is much less educated on average than even the least 
educated cohort of inter-provincial migrants coming to Tibet and competing in local 
urban labour markets (female rural residents from Sichuan). 
 
Table 2: Illiteracy rates among the population aged 15+, by sex, 2004 survey 
 Total Rural City 
 Male Female Male Female Male Female 
TAR 33.5% 54.0% 33.5% 51.8% 33.2% 58.8% 
Qinghai 13.6% 30.9% 20.1% 44.1% 2.8% 9.1% 
Gansu 13.1% 26.0% 17.7% 33.4% 2.1% 9.2% 
Sichuan 7.2% 15.8% 9.3% 19.7% 1.5% 5.6% 
China 5.8% 14.9% 8.0% 19.4% 2.2% 7.4% 
Source: CPSY (2005: Tables 1-27, 1-28 and 1-30).  
 
The upper end of educational asymmetries can be examined through the data on 
education levels attained among the population aged six and older (Table 3 below). 
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No-schooling and illiteracy are treated as synonymous in these data, given that the 
two terms are used interchangeably from year to year; they generally corroborate the 
above illiteracy data, except that they are much more consistent from year to year 
and the implied illiteracy rates are generally lower than the previously cited illiteracy 
rates. However, for the reasons discussed above, we cannot assume that a child with 
primary education is necessarily literate, which would explain both the consistency 
and the discrepancy. Primary education includes literacy classes. Secondary 
education includes junior and senior middle schools, specialised secondary schools, 
and vocational schools. Tertiary education includes junior college, university and 
postgraduates.  
 
Table 3: Education levels of the population aged 6+ by sex, 2004 survey 
6+ population with education including and above: 
Primary Secondary Tertiary 
 
Sub-
Total Male Female 
Sub-
Total Male Female 
Sub-
Total Male Female 
TAR  62.8% 71.4% 54.6% 15.9% 17.7% 14.2% 0.9% 1.3% 0.6% 
Qinghai  80.2% 87.4% 72.6% 44.5% 50.0% 38.7% 4.5% 5.2% 3.8% 
Gansu 83.3% 88.6% 77.7% 48.4% 54.6% 42.0% 5.7% 6.4% 4.9% 
Sichuan  89.8% 93.6% 85.9% 50.0% 53.8% 46.2% 3.6% 4.1% 3.1% 
China  90.8% 94.7% 86.8% 58.5% 63.6% 53.2% 5.8% 6.6% 4.9% 
Source: CPSY (2005: Table 1-23). 
 
In addition to the high levels of illiteracy/no-schooling, the sheer drop-off at the 
secondary level in the TAR is notable in Table 3. This indicates not only that the TAR 
was highly illiterate, but skilled (and Chinese-fluent) labour is also in extremely short 
supply. Only 16 per cent of the TAR population had some form of secondary 
education in 2004, versus 45 per cent in Qinghai, 48 per cent in Gansu, 50 per cent 
in Sichuan and 59 per cent nationally. The share of the surveyed population with 
tertiary levels of education in the TAR was also far lower in 2004 than in all of the 
other cases. Hence, following the same comparison as before, a woman from even 
Qinghai was more than twice as likely as a man in the TAR to have some form of 
secondary schooling, or almost three times as likely to have some form of tertiary 
education.  
 
Table 4: Education levels of population aged six+, rural and city, 2004 survey 
6+ population with education including and above: 
Rural City 
 
Primaru Secondary Tertiary Primary Secondary Tertiary 
TAR  64.1% 13.1% 0.4% 59.5% 22.6% 2.3% 
Qinghai  72.2% 29.5% 0.4% 94.4% 69.2% 9.3% 
Gansu 78.7% 37.4% 0.6% 94.6% 76.3% 18.7% 
Sichuan  87.4% 41.1% 0.5% 96.6% 73.0% 11.9% 
China  88.2% 48.3% 0.9% 95.4% 76.3% 15.1% 
Source: CPSY (2005: Tables 1-24 and 1-26). 
 
According to the rural/city breakdown (Table 4 above), a rural Sichuanese was 
almost twice as likely to have secondary education as a TAR city resident. Only in 
the area of tertiary education is a TAR city resident more likely to have the upper 
hand against the rural dweller from Sichuan. Nonetheless, a city resident from 
Sichuan is more than five times more likely to have tertiary education than his or her 
city Tibetan counterpart in the TAR. Again, these types of asymmetry are simply not 
observed across any other provinces in China.  
 
 
CRISE Working Paper No. 69 
 
 
21 
3. Institutionalist analysis of ethnically exclusionary processes 
 
The economic and educational inequalities discussed in the previous two sections 
highlight a variety of structural disjunctures underlying rapid economic growth. The 
following section explores the exclusionary implications of these disjunctures through 
an institutionalist analysis based on more qualitative research findings.31 This 
interdisciplinary synthesis is essential for understanding actual exclusionary 
processes; the previous quantitative analysis offers clues to these processes by 
revealing the spaces within which we might expect to find exclusions operating, but it 
does not actually provide a means of identifying exclusions. In other words, a 
disparity in itself does not necessarily imply exclusion. For instance, if farmers 
choose to remain in farming, they do not necessarily face exclusion despite poorer 
incomes or educational outcomes. Similarly, rural people migrating to cities and 
towns might face much stronger exclusions than those remaining behind even 
though they also tend to be upwardly mobile, with better incomes and education on 
average, as noted in the last section. Following this example, the purpose of studying 
exclusion is not to identify whether urbanising migrants are excluded in an existential 
sense. Indeed, they are definitely more ‘included’ into the urban economy than their 
rural compatriots, even while simultaneously facing much stronger exclusionary 
pressures. In this sense, exclusion and inclusion work together dialectically, in that 
exclusion plays a role in determining the subordinate integration of migrants into the 
urban economy, whether or not this results in greater income. Indeed, migration 
might lead to an increase in exploitative or degrading work performed by migrants; 
the fact that this would be reflected as rising incomes tells us nothing about the 
exploitation or degradation involved in such work.  
 
This approach to the study of exclusion differs from dominant approaches in the 
literature which tend to focus on the identification of excluded states by way of 
deprivations or disparities, implying that exclusion is more or less synonymous with 
poverty (see Fischer 2008a). As a way to step beyond this dichotomous view, an 
interdisciplinary approach helps to identify institutional modes of integration and/or 
segregation operating across social hierarchies, in ways that can reveal biases and 
advantages operating among comparable cohorts with comparable education levels 
and employment expectations, such as between Tibetan and Han high school and 
university graduates, most of whom do not register in any deprivation or disparity 
measures. Understanding exclusion in this way is important precisely because it 
sheds light on other related social processes such as ‘ethnic’ nationalism and 
conflict.  
 
As background to the overall setting, western development strategies in the Tibetan 
areas can be seen to have accentuated linguistic, cultural and political modes of bias 
deriving from characteristics of the dominant cultural and political group, such as 
Chinese fluency, Chinese work cultures, and connections to government or business 
networks in China proper. These modes of bias can be observed across a variety of 
structural disjunctures and institutionalised patterns of integration. In terms of 
structural disjunctures, educational inequalities between locals and inter-provincial 
migrants in the Tibetan areas obviously disadvantage locals in urban employment 
                                               
31
 ‘Institutionalist’ here refers to the modalities of social ordering (i.e. the instituting of social 
order), as per sociological or historical institutionalist approaches (see Hall and Taylor 1996). 
The definition of institutions that is popular in the recent political science literature is included 
within this broader understanding, e.g. the formal and informal rules and norms guiding 
regularised social interactions, although the liberal bias within this latter definition is also to be 
noted; violations of rules and norms can play as much of a role in social ordering as their 
observance.  
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from the outset. This ‘original’ disadvantage is exacerbated by a striking misfit 
between the employment demands of growth, which are strongly driven by urban 
services and large-scale construction projects, and the actual skills among the large 
majority of Tibetans, most of whom have either no education or only primary level. 
Migration reinforces this disjuncture by saturating the demands for skilled and/or 
educated labour within the structurally polarised growth model, thereby enabling its 
extension while also allowing for equivalent skills formation at the local level to 
remain under-prioritised. Local educational improvements at the primary level do little 
to overcome this disjuncture in the short to medium term given that they take at least 
10 years or more to affect labour supply.  
 
These structural disjunctures are compounded (or, in many cases, caused) by the 
institutionalised patterns of subsidised integration into China. The bulk of lower-
skilled employment that is generated by subsidised growth is concentrated in sectors 
targeted by subsidies, such as tourism and other urban services, construction run by 
out-of-province companies, and commerce. The subsidies themselves are mostly 
directed through state channels centred outside the region. Consequently, the 
channels and targeted sectors confer strong advantage to workers and 
entrepreneurs with Chinese fluency, Chinese work cultures, and connections to 
government or business networks in China proper. Conversely, employment creation 
has been the sparsest in rural-based off-farm industries and services oriented 
towards indigenous demand, in which Chinese fluency would not necessarily be a 
competitive factor. Indeed, this linguistic mode of bias constitutes an important 
cultural dimension of how education confers advantage within a setting of occupation 
and cultural dominance.  
 
As a result, the majority of locals with no education above the primary level (about 84 
per cent of the TAR in 2004) are severely disadvantaged in competing with out-of-
province migrants. Indeed, these aspects of disadvantage in the lower labour strata 
are well inferred by the various indicators of disparity, as discussed in the previous 
section. Implicit within these data is the qualitative understanding that functional 
proficiency in Chinese mostly starts at the secondary level in Tibetan areas. This 
implies that the 84 per cent of Tibetans with no secondary education also probably 
had little or no proficiency in Chinese and thus few significant connections to the Han 
Chinese business circuits dominating most urban economic opportunities. While 
there is little doubt that some increased opportunities for these Tibetans 
accompanied the deluge of subsidies, these would have been concentrated in 
subordinate positions (e.g. in the lowest skill levels of construction on Chinese-run 
job sites) or else in protected niches (e.g. servicing Tibetan clientele or supplying 
Tibetan demand). In most other areas of the urban economy, lesser-educated Han 
Chinese migrants (relative to lowland standards) would easily out-compete such 
Tibetans. Obviously, as noted above, Tibetans in rural areas do not have to contend 
with these competitive pressures from migrants. Rather, it is primarily the upwardly 
mobile urbanising rural migrants, together with the less-educated half of urban 
residents, who are the most confronted by these types of competitive pressures. 
 
Therefore, expansion in the urban secondary and tertiary sectors in the Tibetan 
areas has, to a significant degree, been absorbed by inter-regional migrants, both 
skilled and unskilled, rather than by local rural migrants or the urban poor, ironically 
short-circuiting the whole logic behind urbanisation as a means to ‘modernise’ 
Tibetan labour. These processes of marginalisation in urban employment are difficult 
if not impossible to portray with the publicly available employment data, given that 
these are not broken down by ethnicity and, in any case, they do not capture much of 
the temporary migrant labour nor do they accurately represent unemployment even 
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among permanently registered residents.32 Nonetheless, my own field observations 
and interviews with Tibetan and Chinese scholars and officials, ordinary Tibetans, 
and INGO workers strongly suggest that unemployment is already a substantial and 
possibly increasing burden among urban Tibetans.  
 
3.1 Exclusionary processes at upper labour strata 
 
In contrast to this more general situation facing the large majority of Tibetans, the 
upper labour strata in the Tibetan urban areas are essentially dominated by state-
sector employment (i.e. staff and workers in state-owned units). Hence, exclusionary 
processes in these strata are structured by institutional modalities within such state-
sector employment. Since the early 2000s, these have played out through the 
implementation of state-sector employment reforms (i.e. the end of guaranteed public 
employment for graduates and the introduction of competitive systems of 
recruitment), on top of the continuing institutional norms of political and economic 
subordination and linguistic and cultural biases implicit within the wider development 
strategies, and persistent structural disparities in qualitative educational outcomes at 
similar levels of educational attainment. The synergy of these institutional and 
structural factors, some changing and others not, effectively reinforces linguistic and 
cultural modes of competition and bias within state-sector employment. This leads to 
disadvantages for even those Tibetans with higher levels of educational attainment 
(i.e. those with some level of secondary education and above, at around 16 per cent 
of the TAR population in 2004) and who are thus best suited to overcome the 
disadvantages described above, in that they are the most likely to meet the 
educational and linguistic attributes of advantage relative to the average Han 
migrant.  
 
Therein lays the fallacy of simple intergroup comparisons, because effectively these 
educated Tibetans are not competing with the average Han migrant for the same 
types of employment, but with equivalent cohorts of equally if not more educated Han 
migrants. In other words, the apparent advantages of educated Tibetans with respect 
to lower-skilled employment, as indicated by the comparisons of educational 
attainment, are irrelevant because these lower employment strata are not the targets 
of their employment expectations or strategies. Rather, exclusion operates in the 
employment strata that they do target (i.e. state-sector employment) through similar 
modes of bias as those operating at lower strata (i.e. quantity and/or quality of 
educational outcomes and linguistic biases), albeit through different institutional 
mechanisms. 
 
For instance, the first section discussed the absolute and relative reduction of 
Tibetans employed in the state sector of the TAR and the corresponding increase in 
non-Tibetans (Han) employed. The processes underlying this sudden shift in the 
ethnic balance of state-sector employment do not necessarily imply explicit 
discrimination; they might be as much circumstantial as intentional. The reductions in 
state-sector employment in the TAR, cited above, may have been targeted at 
employment categories with higher representations of Tibetans, such as loss-making 
state-owned enterprises, without explicitly intending to discriminate against Tibetans 
per se. Similarly, the increases in employment may have been targeted at categories 
where Chinese representation is the highest, such as in departments related to the 
construction of the Qinghai-TAR railway or in security-related government posts. 
Nonetheless, the result is effectively discriminatory in the sense that it results in 
                                               
32
 See Hussain (2003: 21-24) for more detail on the problems with official unemployment 
data.  
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discriminatory outcomes regardless of whether discrimination is specifically or 
entirely intended.  
 
This is all the more striking because the restructuring of state-sector employment 
was likely the result of generalised national initiatives by the central government to 
restructure, rationalise and standardise state-sector employment.33 Rationalisation 
refers to the implementation of means-based entry requirements for public 
employment. Standardisation refers to bringing employment, management, 
accounting, contracting, production or other standards in line with the rest of the 
country. As with most major policy decisions stemming from Beijing, these initiatives 
were implemented with reference to the core regions of China, according to criteria 
determined externally to the Tibetan areas. This tendency is reinforced by the 
intensified reliance in the Tibetan areas on external flows of capital and labour for the 
upper layers of the local economy, as analysed in the first section with regard to the 
TAR. This externalised dependence in turn feeds back into demands for increased 
rationalisation and standardisation within the bureaucratised modes of accumulation 
due to concerns from the centre regarding accountability.34 Indeed, principles of 
standardisation might be applied even more stringently in the TAR than in other parts 
of China where local governments are more likely and able to subvert such principles 
to their own needs and agendas. 
  
As with exclusionary dynamics at the lower end of the labour hierarchy, these 
policies effectively discriminate by way of educational disadvantage. The group with 
less educational advantage (i.e. in terms of quality of education, status of degree and 
schooling, or linguistic ability) loses out in the shift towards principles of greater 
procedural equality. Furthermore, the implicit dominance of one group (Han Chinese) 
within rationalisation and standardisation accentuates this imbalance through 
linguistic biases that are imposed in selection criteria (e.g. use of Chinese in 
examinations) or cultural networks that informally underlie the practice of power in 
political and economic units (Ch. guanxi). For example, exams for permanent public 
sector employment, which were introduced in the TAR and other Tibetan areas in the 
early to mid-2000s, are conducted entirely in Chinese, as per the national standard. 
Many local Tibetans and foreign observers in the TAR noted that this placed Tibetans 
competing for such positions at a distinct disadvantage, particularly those who might 
have excellent Tibetan language skills (and are thus ideally suited for governing 
Tibetans), but mediocre or limited Chinese language skills.35 
  
Employment reforms have similarly intensified competition in public employment 
throughout China.36 However, as analysed in Section 2 above, the situation in the 
Tibetan areas is unique due to the educational asymmetry between locals and 
migrants, whereby urban Tibetan locals have much worse education levels on 
average than incoming Han migrants, even Han migrants emigrating from rural 
areas. Interestingly, a similar tension exists between Tibetans in the remote pastoral 
                                               
33
 For instance, see Saich (2004) for discussion of the national reforms in 2003, which cut 1.5 
million state-sector jobs, mostly at higher administrative levels and in the richer provinces. 
34
 Similar dynamics plausibly underlie the trend towards harmonisation of international aid 
among bilateral and multilateral donors at the international level. 
35
 This was noted repeatedly in interviews with INGO staff and Tibetan scholars in Lhasa 
during fieldwork in November 2004. Similar dynamics were noted in interviews in Qinghai in 
2003 and 2004.  
36
 For instance, this was noted in one interview with three Han government officials in Sichuan 
in September 2007. They therefore suggested that the problems that I was describing in the 
Tibetan areas of Sichuan were not particular to Tibetans but were a general quandary 
throughout China. This is true, although the educational asymmetry between urban 
permanent residents and migrants is not. 
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areas of Golok or Yushu in Qinghai, where better-educated non-local Tibetans from 
the farming areas of Rebgong, Chentsa or Xunhua squeeze out less-educated locals 
in competition over local public employment.37 Thus, in the context of increasing 
migration from higher to lower-educated regions, large educational lags combined 
with inferior cultural or social connections to regional centres result in severe 
disadvantages for locals competing for public employment, educated urbanites 
included.  
 
This is the inverse of the norm in most areas of China, where urban residents benefit 
from a natural form of protection in coveted upper strata employment given their 
higher education levels in comparison with rural or western migrants (on average). 
As a result, reforms that promote more merit-based selection procedures for public 
employment tend to privilege local urban residents elsewhere in China. In these 
situations, migrants mainly intensify competition at the lower levels of the labour 
hierarchy, which is a problem for the erstwhile privileged urban working classes, 
many of whom are now laid off (Ch. xiagang), but much less so for the new educated 
elites.38 In addition, urban governments elsewhere in China have had more 
autonomy to protect or promote local skilled labour.39 Tibetan areas have had very 
little autonomy in this regard given their particular situation of political 
disempowerment combined with austerity in public employment more generally, 
particularly outside the TAR. The exceptionality of these educational and political 
asymmetries reflects the observation made by Emily Yeh that Han migrants in Lhasa 
consider themselves of higher ‘quality’ (Ch. suzhi) than local urban residents, in 
contrast to everywhere else in China where migrants are generally considered to be 
of lower ‘quality’ than local urban residents.40   
 
Quantitative literacy rates or educational attainments in this sense underestimate the 
qualitative disadvantages faced by Tibetans in their increasingly Sinicised urban 
economies, given that they include those who are literate in only Tibetan. In other 
words, one can find very literate Tibetan elites with limited Chinese skills (more so in 
the TAR, less so in Qinghai or other areas of eastern Tibet). Indeed, if knowledge of 
Tibetan were a prerequisite for public employment in the TAR, Tibetans would have 
an obvious advantage over Chinese in finding employment in the public sector. This 
argument influenced the policies of the 1980s, when the CCP leadership emphasised 
ethnic competence, based on the idea that local people knew best how to implement 
party policy. However, under current policies, non-hegemonic groups (Tibetans and 
Muslims) are left with the choice to assimilate or be excluded from privilege, yet their 
capability to assimilate is inhibited by their severe lags in quality of education. 
Ultimately, such policies further encourage the external orientation of institutional 
incentives given the competitive demand for Chinese-fluent labour. 
 
                                               
37
 This was noted to me by Susan Costello during a field visit to Darlak, Golok Prefecture, in 
May 2004. Much local conflict pertains to local and non-local Tibetans, symbolised by the 
divisions between ‘nomads’ and ‘farmers’. Non-local ‘farmers’ play a dominant role in public 
employment given that they tend to be better educated, more Sinicised and better connected 
than locals due to the proximity of their home counties to Xining.  
38
 Again, for detailed analyses of these issues in China, see Li (2002), Guo and Chang 
(2006), Li (2008) and Liu (2008). As mentioned in the introduction, for an excellent survey of 
these issues see Roulleau-Berger (2009). 
39
 For instance, see Solinger (1999; 2002), Zhang (2001), Hussain (2003), and Lee and 
Warner (2005a; 2005b).  
40
 Emily Yeh made this argument at a conference in Oslo in December 2008 based on 
research with Han residents in Chengdu who had recently returned from Lhasa. For similar 
earlier expressions, see Yeh (2007).  
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Educational inequality need not have produced such results if the government 
remained committed to policies of proportional ethnic representation in public 
employment, as had been the earlier reform consensus. Tibetan representation in 
state-sector staff and worker employment in the TAR reached a peak of 89 per cent 
in 1982, just after Hu Yaobang encouraged Tibetanisation of government 
employment and permitted the departure of a large contingent of Han cadres. This 
high level was quickly reversed the following year and fell back down to around 70 
per cent, where it remained throughout most of the 1980s and 1990s. The change in 
2002-03 was therefore unprecedented throughout the entire reform period and marks 
a distinct departure from the implicit institutional compromise between Tibetan elites 
and the state in the first two decades of reform. More generally, these state-sector 
employment dynamics reflect shifts in the dominant paradigms of minority area 
governance in China rather than Tibetan capabilities,41 given that Tibetan education 
levels were much worse on average in the 1980s and 1990s than in the 2000s. Thus, 
the implementation of labour market reforms in these areas has reinforced the 
widespread perception that the Chinese leadership does not trust the loyalty of 
Tibetan cadres and is antagonistic to even the limited forms of political space that 
had been maintained up to the early 2000s.  
 
3.2 The case of employment reforms in Qinghai 
 
The Tibetan areas in Qinghai provide a particularly illustrative case of these 
dynamics related to the implementation of the national reforms of state-sector 
employment. According to my discussions with a variety of officials, scholars, 
teachers and students,42 the phasing out of guaranteed graduate employment 
elsewhere in China started in the early 1990s. In Qinghai, the reform had been 
planned since 1997 and was implemented in 2001 for university students and in 2002 
for high school students.43 Prior to this time, employment for graduates had been 
more or less guaranteed by either county governments or various work units (i.e. a 
medical student would be given a job placement by the health department, a student 
from the ‘normal’ teachers schools by the education department, etc), although 
students could opt out if offered private-sector employment. Employment allocation 
since 2001 has become more competitive and, thus, purportedly more meritocratic 
and rationalised. Each work unit has a fixed number of posts and hires through open 
competition. The delayed implementation of these reforms was in line with the 
typically gradualist manner of applying national reforms to the western or poorer 
provinces more slowly than in central or coastal provinces, and in deference to 
discretion at the provincial level.44  
 
                                               
41
 Notably, the timing of the employment restructuring in the TAR, particularly with respect to 
cadre employment, also suggests links with the new leadership of President Hu Jintao in 
Beijing. As party secretary in the TAR during the Lhasa uprisings in March 1989, Hu ordered 
martial law and was associated with the end of the relatively liberal period of the 1980s. 
42
 In particular, I had several key interviews between June and August 2004 with one senior 
Chinese official of Malho Prefecture, two senior Tibetan officials of Rebgong County (both 
meetings in Rongwo Town, Rebgong County), and a group of three Tibetan officials of 
Chabcha County, four Tibetan high school teachers and one Tibetan graduate student in 
Chabcha Town. In addition, over the course of my fieldwork I had numerous occasions to 
discuss these issues with high school students and teachers in Rongwo and Xining.   
43
 Information regarding the timing of the reform is based on my interviews mentioned in the 
previous footnote.  
44
 Apparently, these reforms were delayed in the Tibet Autonomous Region, the most 
sensitive of all provinces in China, until 2006 (personal communications with Melvyn 
Goldstein, October 2007).  
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Those affected most by the reforms tended to be graduates with a medium quality of 
senior-secondary or tertiary education. For instance, a senior Han official from Malho 
Prefecture noted that the bottom range of students tend to drop out as early as lower 
middle school and return to work in farming or herding, or else engage in self-
employed trades or small-scale business. The top students (mostly Han) tend to 
leave the area, either for universities elsewhere in China or for jobs in larger cities 
such as Xining or beyond. The next top students, those who might not have 
succeeded in entering universities outside the province yet who nonetheless have a 
strong provincial university education in the mainstream (Han) system, tend to return 
to the area and compete relatively well in the new labour market.  
 
The middle range of students, particularly those from the minority high schools and 
universities,45 is squeezed by these new competitive conditions. This range 
represents the bulk of Tibetan (and Muslim) students, especially those from rural 
areas who are attracted (or restricted) to the minority educational track due to the 
lower fees and entry requirements in the minority system. As background, the 
minority education system is largely viewed as a means to gradually bring about the 
assimilation of Tibetan students into a Chinese-dominated system and thus there is a 
humanities bias in minority education that derives from this official attitude.46 Despite 
functioning as minority schools, the focus in these schools is on learning Chinese 
language and Chinese subjects and only limited content in Tibetan is offered. 
Moreover, Tibetan content has been progressively cut back in recent years due to 
the competitive pressures induced by labour reforms, which have increased the 
demand for Chinese content. On the other hand, subjects that would be useful for the 
transitional context in Tibet, such as vocational, managerial or scientific education, 
are severely undersupplied compared to other western provinces, as noted 
previously. These biases were not pressing problems in the past so long as graduate 
employment was guaranteed, but under the new competitive system of employment 
the value of degrees from minority schools is depreciated both by the mainstream 
school system as well as by employers, given that competition places a premium on 
the perceived quality of education (defined by the standard of the mainstream Han 
culture). Thus the two-tiered education system, which since the early 1980s had 
been an important part of the political compromise offered to minority elites in 
minority autonomous areas, is increasingly perceived as leading to fast-track 
assimilation as well as redundancy and marginalisation. 
 
It is important to note that many of these upwardly aspiring Tibetan youths possess 
among the highest levels of education in their respective communities and come from 
families that can afford such levels of education, particularly at the tertiary level, 
where tuition fees far exceed average rural per capita incomes in these areas.47 In 
                                               
45
 in the Tibetan areas outside the TAR, a system of minority education, from primary up to 
tertiary levels, parallels the mainstream Han schools, which will be discussed further below. 
See Yi (2005a; 2005b) for two excellent studies of these parallel systems in Rebgong. 
46
 On this point, all of the Tibetans with whom I discussed these issues during field work in 
2003 and 2004 expressed the same contention, including more than 20 teachers, more than 
100 students, 10 scholars, eight officials from county or prefecture education departments, 
and five Western scholars and INGO workers with long-term experience working in education 
in Tibet. This perception was shared in all Tibetan areas that I visited. I therefore take this 
insight as common knowledge, deriving from the fact that the minority education system is 
explicitly focused on assimilation and does have a humanities bias. Also see Bass (1998; 
2005) and Yi (2005a; 2005b).  
47
 For instance, in the case of one family interviewed in Chentsa County in 2004, their 
daughter had just entered the Qinghai minority nationality university in Xining, for which they 
were paying a total of 7,000 yuan per year through borrowing. Average per capita rural 
household income in 2004 was 1,958 yuan.  
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the case of rural students, many are the first of their household to reach a secondary 
or tertiary level of education and they therefore carry their own as well as their 
family’s aspiration to join the relatively elite workforce of public employees. The 
senior official mentioned above admitted that it was precisely this middle range of 
students that experienced the most dislocation under the new system, given that they 
had difficulty competing for higher-status jobs but they did not want to work in lower-
status jobs, particularly in jobs considered unworthy of a senior secondary or tertiary 
education. These perceptions were confirmed to me repeatedly in numerous 
interviews and conversations with scores of Tibetan high school and university 
students or recent graduates from the minority education system, who consistently 
stressed that it was very difficult to obtain appropriate employment that corresponded 
to their level and type of education. 
 
In this context, many of my interviewees commented that wealthy Tibetans, and in 
particular Tibetan cadres, are increasingly sending their children to mainstream 
Chinese schools, which have higher entry criteria and are more expensive than the 
minority schools (although even minority high schools and universities are very 
expensive for the average rural Tibetan). Those who cannot afford the mainstream 
schools are left with the reinforced impression that secondary and tertiary minority 
education is of diminishing value, given that it is no longer able to secure coveted 
public sector jobs and is thus no longer worth the investment.  As a result, in the face 
of increasing tuition fees and the chronic unemployment of graduates, many poorer 
rural families are opting out of secondary education or, at the very least, placing it at 
a lower level of priority within their household livelihood strategies.48 Therefore, the 
issue of educational inequality has increasingly become intra as well as interethnic.  
 
These various disjunctures present a catch-22 between the choices of integration or 
segregation, both of which ultimately place educated Tibetans at a disadvantage 
within the context of intensified competition over the limited employment 
opportunities. In recent years, there has definitely been a strong and self-aware push 
from within Tibetan society to educate their young people. However, Tibetans 
educated in Chinese and in mainstream schools are disadvantaged within these 
schools on linguistic and cultural grounds, as well as by less supportive conditions for 
competing in education.49 Yet, while the minority education system is more 
accessible to Tibetans, the lower standards in these schools, particularly according to 
the needs of an increasingly competitive commercial economy, leave graduates at a 
strong disadvantage after graduation, compared to graduates from the mainstream 
schools.  
 
Furthermore, since the reforms, official government employment strategies for 
unemployed high school and university graduates, as well as for laid-off staff or 
workers, have largely focused on encouraging self-employment or small private 
business start-ups. For instance, during a visit to Chentsa in June 2004, I interviewed 
one young unemployed male Tibetan university graduate who was attending a 
county-run workshop on how to set up and run a small business, based on ILO 
course material on this subject translated into Chinese. Attendance at these 
workshops was required in order to receive unemployment benefits of 150 yuan a 
                                               
48
 Most of the teachers, scholars, officials and field workers mentioned in footnote 46 noted 
these trends.  
49
 For instance, Chinese middle-class children in Xining or Rebgong at the secondary level 
typically receive private tuition throughout their summer holidays, whereas most of the rural 
Tibetan students that I interviewed, particularly the young women, were required to perform 
farm or herding work during these same holidays and few besides those from elite families 
could afford extra tuition.  
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month. This system of welfare conjoined with training was new, coinciding with the 
end of guaranteed employment.  
 
This strategy effectively promotes a downward move into stigmatised intermediate 
positions of the labour hierarchy, such as in private urban services and commerce. In 
particular, these intermediate positions in Tibetan areas are precisely those that were 
traditionally and newly dominated by Muslims. In light of Tibetan stigmatisation of 
these types of activity and of Muslims,50 these programmes likely added insult to 
unemployed status or upward aspirations by implying that such relatively privileged 
Tibetans should rub shoulders and compete with Muslims over common types of 
activity deemed the domain of the uncultivated. Combined with the more general 
disadvantages faced in obtaining employment, such experiences create a powerful 
fusion of feelings of discrimination, dislocation and indignation. Indeed, in recent 
years, the fusion has often mutated into forms of anti-Muslim activism by Tibetans in 
Qinghai.51  
 
Disadvantages in obtaining employment also intensify out-migration from these 
Tibetan areas. For instance, five different rural families that I interviewed in Qinghai 
in summer 2004 were planning to send one of their teenagers to India, even though 
the teenager was already successfully progressing in their secondary schooling. All 
five families explained that this was due to the cost of education. When I noted that 
the cost of illegal refugee migration to India was even greater, two answered that ‘the 
Dalai Lama’ was taking care of the students in India through his schools, while three 
replied that the county-level secondary education was worthless for securing 
employment after graduation. Four of the families also noted that the minority 
education system was causing their children to lose their culture. In other words, the 
catch-22 between integration and segregation as perceived in various ways by these 
families reinforced their impression that development was undermining Tibetan 
society, particularly through the assimilation of its most educated youth into 
mainstream Chinese society while at the same time marginalising them from 
respectable employment opportunities.  
 
These dilemmas, which were described to me in a very similar manner by most of the 
Tibetan teachers, scholars and officials I interviewed, led most of these respondents 
to the logical conclusion that increased autonomy at county and prefecture levels is 
required in order to reverse such disadvantages in local employment, albeit in ways 
that are in accordance with the China National Minority Regional Autonomy Law 
(adopted in 1984). For instance, Tibetan language proficiency could be made a 
requirement for employment in local governments, which would be an affirmative 
action stipulation permitted under the 1984 law. Ideally, this would be supported by 
an integrated regional Tibetan education system and curriculum, consolidated across 
all of the Tibetan areas in China in order to achieve a scale necessary for institutional 
self-sufficiency. Notably, in explaining these solutions to me, my respondents 
explicitly or implicitly echoed the advocacy of several Tibetan leaders inside Tibet, 
particularly the late Panchen Lama, who argued in the 1980s for precisely these uses 
of the National Minority Law as a means to support effective rather than merely 
nominal minority nationality autonomy in China.52 They also echoed the ongoing 
                                               
50
 See Fischer (2005b; 2008b; 2008e) on the stigmatisation of Muslims and of these forms of 
work.  
51
 See Fischer (2005b; 2008b).  
52
 Much of my understanding of the Panchen Lama’s non-secessionist nationalist advocacy 
comes from extensive conversations in 2000 and 2001 with a exiled ex-monk from Tashi 
Lhunpoe, the head monastery of the Panchen Lama in Shigatse, TAR, during my time in the 
Tibetan refugee community in India. This was supplemented with many more discussions with 
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advocacy for increased Tibetan autonomy by the Dalai Lama, including his emphasis 
on the importance of modern secular education for preserving Tibetan culture.53  
 
In the course of my fieldwork in 2004, one event occurred that is representative of 
such advocacy. On 21 September 2004, a demonstration of at least 200 mostly 
Tibetan students started outside local government offices in Dawu, the prefecture 
capital of Golok in Qinghai. The protest was peaceful and was supported by local 
officials through the provisioning of tents and food (RFA 2004). Based on my own 
further inquiries with Golok Tibetans in Xining, the protest continued into November. 
The purpose of the protest was to demand employment, particularly considering that 
the students’ families had been encouraged to pay high college fees with the promise 
that their children would secure good jobs after graduating. The students therefore 
claimed that officials had failed to deliver on these promises and were instead giving 
jobs to outside candidates brought into the area. They demanded that local 
applicants should be given preference (ibid). The contestation underlying this event 
refers precisely to the employment reform in 2001, which was implemented while 
these students were studying, as well as to austerity in public employment over the 
same period. A similar event in Lhasa took place in 2006, in conjunction with the 
beginning of the labour reforms in that province. According to RFA (2006), a group of 
graduates protested after only two of 100 public jobs where given to ethnic Tibetans 
following an open exam competition (conducted in Chinese). Ironically, in the face of 
marketising labour reforms, these events appear to signal the predilection of 
relatively elite Tibetans within China to advocate for a return to earlier socialist 
legacies of labour market regulation as a means for assuring preferential and 
representative treatment in public employment.  
 
 
4. Conclusion: dislocating hierarchies and conflict 
 
In the context of educational inequalities and urban labour market reforms, the 
minority education system of the Tibetan areas, while originally devised to offer 
preferential treatment to minorities, ironically results in a catch-22 for minority groups 
between assimilation and segregation. On the one hand, they are educationally 
disadvantaged in the mainstream system due to linguistic or cultural biases, or even 
economically disadvantaged due to the higher costs of such education compared to 
the minority system. On the other hand, the segregated option ultimately leads to 
later disadvantage in urban employment, given that the value or content of minority 
education is devalued by the dominant group. This situation has been exacerbated 
by the fact that employment reforms curtailed guaranteed or preferential employment 
in favour of more meritocratic principles (defined according to the dominant group), 
combined with intensified inter-group competition over employment opportunities due 
to increased migration.  
 
Improving absolute education outcomes does little to improve this institutional 
disjuncture between education and employment systems; if anything, it exacerbates 
                                                                                                                                       
Tibetans in Amdo during my fieldwork in 2004, such as those mentioned in the footnotes 
above. For academic references, see Schwartz (1994), Hilton (1999), Barnett (1998; 2006), 
and TIN (2004). 
53
 Again, my knowledge of this mostly comes from having attended numerous teachings by 
the Dalai Lama during my time in the Tibetan refugee community in India from 1995 to 2001. 
In particular, several thousand Tibetans from Tibet usually legally or illegally cross the border 
and attend his annual Spring Teachings, or his occasional teachings and empowerments held 
in various locations in India. During these events, the Dalai Lama usually talks at length about 
the importance of modern secular education as a means of preserving Tibetan culture and 
identity.  
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it. Indeed, the end of preferential employment strategies risks accelerating the 
redundancy of the minority system precisely at a time when education policy is 
pushing for an increase in absolute education outcomes within this same minority 
system. Within this context, urban employment exclusion increasingly pivots on axes 
determined by the changing qualitative aspects of education demanded by urban 
employers, such as language ability or status of degree. Logically, minority (non-
secessionist) nationalist responses to this have increasingly advocated for local 
minority control over employment. The impasse highlights the very valid importance 
of designing educational strategies in conjunction with urban employment strategies, 
along with the need for effective political representation and decision-making by 
minority groups within these designs. 
 
These insights, particularly at upper strata of local labour hierarchies, put into 
question the mainstream human development focus on absolute levels of education 
as a means of addressing the exclusion of ethnic minorities in the context of social 
and economic transition. The research instead directs attention to the structuring of 
both quantitative and qualitative educational inequalities among comparable cohorts 
with similar types of employment expectation in their respective labour hierarchies. 
For this, structural disjunctures must be examined, not simply to identify disparities, 
but in order to directly and/or indirectly identify the spaces in which we might expect 
to find exclusion operating. Further insight then requires an interdisciplinary 
institutionalist exploration of the modes of integration operating within these spaces. 
Exclusion in this sense is not the same as a disparity, in that a disparity merely 
indicates the potential for disadvantages to actualise in the context of polarised social 
encounters. Nor is exclusion necessarily a disadvantage, in the sense that 
exclusionary processes, whether structurally or institutionally determined, set the 
conditions for disadvantages to be actualised. Disadvantages, like exclusions, are 
relative to the social strata in which a person wishes or needs to enter and/or 
participate; exclusionary obstructions or repulsions faced in attempts to enter or 
participate thereby set the terms of disadvantage within these social strata, although 
not necessarily in other strata.  
 
Indeed, such an approach brings to light the importance of differentiating exclusion 
from poverty (even relative poverty) given that exclusionary processes can occur 
vertically throughout a social hierarchy, among the poor and the non-poor, and in 
many cases these processes might intensify with movements out of poverty, such as 
during urbanisation or other forms of migration. Indeed, the most politically 
contentious exclusions are often those that occur among relatively elite and/or 
upwardly mobile sections of a population. Therefore, the methodological challenge 
that faces studies of exclusion, as with the horizontal inequality approach (i.e. 
Stewart 2002), lies in finding ways to measure structural disjunctures and institutional 
modes of integration that move beyond either absolute measures, as per mainstream 
approaches to human development, or relative (i.e. inequality) measures, given that 
both are only capable of identifying potential exclusions occurring at the bottom of a 
social hierarchy.54 
 
Along these lines, the Tibetan context suggests that exclusionary processes are 
particularly significant for Tibetan elites given the potential loss of both position and 
dignity. Many of these elites who have positioned themselves as junior partners 
within Chinese rule have undoubtedly been better placed than many commoners to 
weather the dislocations caused by recent developments. However, the relative 
employment security that they managed to maintain up to the 1990s has since been 
                                               
54
 For more detail on the implications of these insights for the study of exclusion, see Fischer 
(2008a). 
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considerably eroded, with no guarantee of similar security for their progeny. Instead, 
the future offers the threat of downward mobility for many in the local social 
hierarchy. Government strategies of self-employment and small business start-ups 
potentially irk the dignity of these once-privileged Tibetans, as well as that of 
upwardly aspiring graduates, if not openly insulting them by suggesting that, after all 
of their education and/or privilege, they should compete shoulder to shoulder on an 
equal level with Muslims and low-cultured Han migrants in a variety of socially 
scorned activities.  
 
Thus, precisely as the state made stronger efforts to expand education, it also moved 
towards a stronger assimilationist position together with strong exclusionary 
pressures in labour markets. Ultimately, the situation breeds considerable frustration 
and alienation, while the additional elite option of full assimilation further accentuates 
class polarisation among Tibetans themselves. In particular, the seemingly dead-end 
scenario reinforces the belief among many quarters of both common and elite 
Tibetans that the only solution is found in nationalist (although not necessarily 
secessionist) politics, i.e. increased local control over education and employment in 
order to create the conditions whereby Tibetan-prioritised education can be 
supported by Tibetan-prioritised employment.  
 
In other words, within these modes of integration predicated by the assimilating 
drives of the state, there is a tight synchronicity between experiences of exclusion 
and contestation. These experiences are most notable at the middle and upper levels 
of the urban labour hierarchy, i.e. among those who have been able to afford 
secondary and tertiary education (which mostly takes place in urban areas), or who 
can afford unemployed status (or to support an unemployed family member in an 
urban area). In contrast, perhaps those who face least exclusion are those who have 
decided to remain in rural areas and to tie their fortunes to the fate of agriculture, and 
who are typically considered among the poorest in contemporary China. While such 
poverty is deserving of our normative attention, exclusion among the non-poor is 
deserving of our analytical attention precisely because of its importance in 
determining the trajectories of various social processes such as conflict.  
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Methodological Appendix 
 
This study is derived from a larger interdisciplinary research project examining 
Chinese development strategies in Tibet. Given limited access to data and the 
difficulties of conducting field work, quantitative and qualitative research methods 
were iterated in an attempt to innovate a research method capable of examining 
politically sensitive issues within a tightly controlled field setting characterised by 
occupation and repressed political dissent.  
 
Quantitative data were mostly obtained from publicly available official statistical 
sources, such as the 2000 census tabulations, the China Population Statistics 
Yearbook from various years, and the China (and various provincial) Statistical 
Yearbook from various years. While the precise accuracy of these official sources is 
often doubted, the alternative of conducting independent household surveys was 
impossible given the political situation. However, in defence of these data sources, I 
have generally found that they corroborate fieldwork in terms of representing broad 
structural trends over time. The issue of precise accuracy was therefore not an 
overwhelming obstacle for the inductive nature of quantitative analysis required for 
this study.  
 
The data is nonetheless limited by what has and has not been divulged in official 
sources. Outside of population censuses, official Chinese sources do not 
disaggregate data by ethnicity. Thus some creative extrapolation is often required in 
order to circumvent the data limitations and to tease out insights from the available 
data. This includes using the rural data for the TAR, which represents an almost 
entirely Tibetan experience, as a proxy for the general experience of Tibetans 
outside the TAR. The rural data of the other Chinese provinces containing Tibetan 
autonomous areas is overwhelmed by the population weight of non-Tibetans in the 
non-Tibetan areas of the respective provinces. Using the TAR data to approximate 
broad trends outside the TAR is arguably a valid approach, at least with respect to 
rural areas, given strong similarities across Tibetan areas and stark differences 
between these areas and everywhere else in China in terms of topography, 
population density, patterns of land-use and livelihood, levels and composition of 
average rural household incomes, education levels, and health indices. Nonetheless, 
effort has been made throughout this study to find suitable sub-provincial data for 
Tibetan areas outside the TAR in order to render this proxy method more rigorous.  
 
Similarly, the qualitative methods of this study were somewhat eclectic given the 
broad scale and political sensitivity of the issues researched. Formal surveys were 
not possible and thus the field methods were basically ethnographic in nature. 
Nonetheless, a wide variety of field sites was sampled, each with much less depth 
than would be normally accorded by purely ethnographic methods. This approach 
was taken partly to avoid spending too much time in each community for political 
reasons, and also partly as a means to trace broader processes of circulation across 
the regional Tibetan system. The resultant fieldwork was analysed along the lines of 
Grounded Theory (i.e., Glaser 1992), in the sense that the commonalities or 
similarities that appeared throughout the fieldwork have been emphasised as a 
means to generate deeper insight into patterns found in the quantitative data and 
also to guide new lines of quantitative (and qualitative) inquiry, up until a point where 
no new data, whether quantitative or qualitative, substantially alters or challenges the 
emerging theory. Again, this interdisciplinary systemic approach offers particular 
scientific value even though it requires some creative eclecticism. While it is true that 
there are enormous variations across Tibet and even between two valleys, strong 
commonalities can nonetheless be observed across this cultural and topographic 
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region the size of Western Europe, giving credence to indigenous notions of Tibet 
that transcend modern political boundaries. 
 
The fieldwork included 12 months spent in Tibet and China between June 2003 and 
January 2005, and two subsequent one-month visits in December 2005 and 
September 2007. This was more generally informed by seven years of pre-doctoral 
field experience living in Tibetan refugee communities in India and Nepal from 1995 
to 2001. The fieldwork in Tibet was conducted in all three of the major Tibetan 
regions (Utsang, Kham and Amdo) and in four of the five Chinese provinces 
containing Tibetan areas (the TAR, Qinghai, Sichuan and Gansu). The largest 
portion of time was concentrated in Amdo/Qinghai due to a range of concerns, from 
logistics and freedom of movement to research interest. Extensive visits were made 
to both farming and pastoral areas in Qinghai, Sichuan and Gansu, including 
repeated and extended contact within eight rural communities. Limited rural travel 
was also undertaken in the TAR, although this was restricted due to the heavy 
controls over the movement of foreign researchers outside Lhasa. Urban areas 
visited included (Tibetan names used for Tibetan towns): Lhasa and Shigatse in the 
TAR; Xining, Xunhua, Chentsa, Rebgong, Sogwo, Chabcha, Mangra, Jyeku, Dawu 
and Darlak in Qinghai; Lanzhou, Linxia and Labrang (Ch. Xiahe) in Gansu; Chengdu, 
Sershul, Derge, Manikango, Kardze, Drango, Dawu, Tagong, Dartsedo (Ch. 
Kangding) and Ngawa in Sichuan; and several short visits to several research 
centres and universities in Beijing. The urban areas were chosen because of their 
importance as regional centres for local government administration, education, 
business, off-farm employment, and migration.  
 
Fieldwork entailed informal and unstructured interviews, conversations, focus groups, 
participant observation, and general living experience within households in several of 
these settings, in both rural and urban areas. Interviewee selection was determined 
through snowball sampling; the politicised nature of the research precluded both 
representative sampling as well as extended ethnographic contacts. Some interviews 
were conducted by myself in Tibetan (mostly in Central Tibet), some were conducted 
by myself in English with Tibetans or Chinese who spoke English, and about half 
were conducted with the assistance of either a Tibetan translator (in the case of 
interviews with Tibetans, particularly those from Eastern Tibet) or a Chinese 
translator (in the case of interviews with Chinese or Muslims and some educated 
Tibetans). The exact number of informants is difficult to quantify because in many 
cases contact was made in very fluid social settings. However, it is possible to 
enumerate roughly 228 key informants, in terms of contacts that resulted in 
significant and substantive field insights. This sampling was disproportionately 
weighted towards more elite informants, particularly local Tibetan, Chinese or Muslim 
scholars who have a wealth of knowledge but are considerably more constrained 
than foreign researchers in the dissemination of their findings.  
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